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Should Oscar Run? 
Peter Charlish* & Dr. Stephen Riley† 
BACKGROUND 
Oscar Pistorius is a South African sprinter who was aiming to 
run at the Beijing Olympic Games in the summer of 2008, either in 
the 200 meters or the 400 meters.  Given his physical condition, 
this may at first glance have appeared to be a ludicrous 
proposition.  Pistorius was born without fibula bones and 
consequently had both legs amputated below the knee before his 
first birthday.  He competes using a pair of prosthetic limbs 
attached to his legs.  These J-shaped carbon fiber blades are known 
as “Cheetahs.”1  The International Olympic Committee (“IOC”) 
and the International Association of Athletics Federations 
(“IAAF”), after conducting a series of tests, concluded on January 
14, 2008 that Pistorius was ineligible for entry into the Games.2  
This Article looks at the circumstances surrounding the decision to 
ban Pistorius and further examines previous precedent and 
philosophical argument, which suggest that perhaps Pistorius has 
 
A PDF version of this article is available online at http://law.fordham.edu/publications/ 
article.ihtml?pubID=200&id=2759.  Visit http://www.iplj.net for access to the complete 
Journal archive. 
* Peter Charlish (P.Charlish@shu.ac.uk) is the Acting Head of the Law Department 
and Subject Leader for Sports Law at Sheffield Hallam University.  He received his M.A. 
Law and M/Phil from the University of Sheffield. 
† Dr. Stephen Riley (S.Riley@shu.ac.uk) is a lecturer in law at Sheffield Hallam 
University.  He received his LL.M. in Law from the University of Nottingham and Ph.D. 
in Law from Lancaster University. 
 1 See Matthew Pryor, Oscar Pistorius Is Put Through His Paces to Justify His Right to 
Run, TIMES (London), Nov. 20, 2007, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/ 
sport/more_sport/athletics/article2903673.ece (noting that the Icelandic engineered limbs 
modelled after the shape of the foot of a cheetah). 
 2 Oscar Pistorius Banned From Olympics, TIMES ONLINE, Jan. 14, 2008, 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/sport/more_sport/athletics/article3184427.ece. 
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been judged too harshly and that it may be time to re-examine the 
eligibility rules for Olympic competition. 
In March 2007, Pistorius finished second in the South African 
national championships in the 400 meters, which qualified him for 
their 4 x 400 meters relay team.  Although Pistorius has still not 
achieved the individual qualifying time for the 400 meters, his 
achievement in the national championship, coupled with the 
likelihood of the South African team qualifying as one of the 16 
fastest nations in the world, meant that it was highly likely that 
Pistorius would have been at the Olympic Games, at the very least 
in his capacity as a member of that relay team.  However in March 
2007, following the emergence of Pistorius as a realistic candidate 
for the South African team, the IAAF introduced an amendment to 
their rules which prohibited the: “use of any technical device that 
incorporates springs, wheels or any other element that provides the 
user with an advantage over another athlete not using such a 
device.”3  Some have suggested that this rule was introduced 
specifically to deal with the threat posed by Pistorius,4 an 
allegation vehemently denied by IAAF council member Robert 
Hersh.  Hersh stated that “[w]e did not legislate against his specific 
device because we haven’t looked at his specific legs.”5  Some 
critics have argued that his carbon fibre prosthetics give Pistorius 
an advantage over other competitors and that allowing his 
participation may signal the beginning of a very slippery slope.6  
Despite the existence of the rule, Pistorius was initially at least 
 
 3 IAAF Competition Rule 144.2 (2008), available at http://www.iaaf.org/news/ 
newsId=42896.printer.html; see also Steve Goldberg, Do Disabled Athletes Have an 
Edge?, TIME, June 8, 2007, available at http://www.time.com/time/world/article/ 
0,8599,1631050,00.htm.  Reportedly, athletes in the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games will 
attempt to use masks to prevent against pollution.  It will be interesting to see if this rule 
is applied so as to prevent distance runners from wearing these masks during competition. 
 4 Jere Longman, Disabled Runner Makes Case for Competing in Olympics, INT’L 
HERALD TRIB., May 14, 2007, available at http://www.iht.com/bin/print.php? 
id=5704964 (including rowers Robert Gailey, from University of Miami Medical School, 
and Angela Schneider, a sports ethicist from University of Western Ontario and a 1984 
Olympic silver medalist, as examples). 
 5 Goldberg, supra note 3. 
 6 See John Inverdale, Oscar Pistorius Ruling Should Be Heartless, DAILY TELEGRAPH, 
Nov. 21, 2007, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/main.jtml?xml=/sport/2007/11/21/ 
soinve121.xml. 
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temporarily given permission to compete, subject to the future 
investigation (the results of which were announced on January 14, 
2008) into the nature of his prosthetic limbs, which was eventually 
used to extinguish his hopes of competing in the Games.  Although 
the decisive ruling went against Pistorius, there does remain the 
possibility, remote though it may be, that the IOC could yet 
overrule the IAAF, for the IOC retains the right to set their own 
eligibility rules and reserves the right to intervene against the 
decision of a governing body if they feel it is necessary.7 
Pistorius would not have been the first disabled athlete to 
compete in the Olympic Games.8  In 2000 and again in 2004 Marla 
Runyon from the United States, who is legally blind due to 
Stargardt’s disease,9 ran in the 1500 meters and the 5000 meters.  
Two archers have also breached the divide between able-bodied 
and disabled sport: wheelchair bound Paola Fantato represented 
Italy at the 1996 Athens Olympics and New Zealand’s Neroli 
Fairhall was only denied a place at the Moscow Games by the 
International boycott, although she reached the Los Angeles 
Games in 1984.  As far back as 1904, at the St. Louis Games, the 
American gymnast George Eyser actually won six medals, 
including three gold medals, while competing with a wooden leg.10  
The traffic is not one way between disabled and able-bodied sport.  
With the backing of the British Wheelchair Racing Association 
and Dame Tanni Grey-Thompson,11 “able-bodied” Daniel Sadler 
has been competing in wheelchair events for twelve years.12  Grey-
 
 7 See Longman, supra note 4. 
 8 For details of disabled sports participants who have competed with “able-bodied” 
participants in the United States see Eldon L. Ham, Disabled Athletes: A Last Vestige of 
Court Tolerated Discrimination?, 8 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 741, 749 (1998). 
 9 Stargardt’s disease is an inherited degenerative condition, the most common form of 
which begins in late childhood and leads to legal blindness. See Richard L. Windsor & 
Laura K. Windsor, Understanding Stargardt’s Disease, Vision Worldwide, 
http://www.visionww.org/drswindsor-stargardt.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2008). 
 10 See Goldberg, supra note 3. 
 11 Profile of Tanni Grey-Thompson, BBC.com, http://www.bbc.co.uk/ouch/ 
paralympics/profiles/tanni_grey_thompson.shtml (last visited Feb. 11, 2008) (Thompson 
is a multiple gold-medal winning paralympic athlete). 
 12 Mr. Sadler began competing because of his father, who was a competitor paralyzed 
from the waist down. See Tom Fordyce, Sadler’s Sit-down Protest, BBC.com, Apr. 3, 
2002, http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/other_sports/1909192.stm. 
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Thompson commented: “People assume Dan has an unfair 
advantage.  He hasn’t,” she said.  “He may have stomach muscles 
that work, but he’s carrying more weight, he gets leg cramps, and 
he makes a less aerodynamic shape.”13 
He competed in the Great North Run in 2001, although the 
prize-money he won was withdrawn when the organisers realized 
that he was “able-bodied.”14  His story only came to prominence 
when he attempted and failed to gain admittance to the London 
Marathon in 2007, despite the fact that the rules for wheelchair 
athletes competing in the marathon make no mention of the 
necessity for a competitor to be ordinarily confined to a 
wheelchair.15  The rules refer only to the necessity for competitors 
to be secured into their wheelchair during the marathon and to 
propel the chair with hands and arms only.16 
The interpretation attached to the rule introduced by the IAAF 
in March17 played a crucial part in the decision concerning 
Pistorius’ eligibility.  Elio Locatelli18 explained the rule by saying: 
“With all due respect, we cannot accept something that provides 
advantages. . . . It affects the purity of sport. Next will be another 
device where people can fly with something on their back.”19 
The kind of sensationalist language used by Locatelli does the 
IAAF no credit and unfortunately appears to move the debate 
surrounding these particular prosthetic limbs from the legal and 
scientific and into the territory more associated with tabloid 
newspapers.  To reiterate, the rule prohibits the: “use of any 
technical device that incorporates springs, wheels or any other 
 
 13 See id. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Wheelchair Marathon Rules and Regulations, Disability Sport Events, 
http://www.disabilitysport.org.uk/sports/dyncat.cfm?catid=1888 (last visited Feb. 11, 
2008). 
 16 Id. Rule 3(a). 
 17 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 18 Elio Locatelli is the director of development for the IAAF. See Jere Longman, An 
Amputee Sprinter: Is He Disabled or Too-Abled?, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2007, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/15/sports/othersports/15runner.html. 
 19 Id. 
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element that provides the user with an advantage over another 
athlete not using such a device.”20 
What is beyond question is that the limbs used by Pistorius are 
technical devices.  Further, Hugh Herr, Associate Professor at 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology,21 argued that they have 
spring-like qualities: “The prosthetic he’s using is completely 
passive—it’s just a spring.”22  The implication of this statement 
may at first glance appear to have been fatal to Pistorius’ chances 
to compete in the Olympics.  Herr’s statement implies that on a 
crude reading of IAAF rule 144.223 the prosthetic limbs appear to 
violate it.  However, Herr then goes on to explain the nature of a 
spring and these particular limbs, suggesting that a spring will not 
produce its own energy, but will merely return a percentage of 
what is put in; this contrasts with the human foot which will 
generate its own energy on contact with the ground.  Herr explains 
that the generation of force off the ground produced by the human 
leg, “comes from the muscles, and [Pistorius] has no muscles,”24 
which would suggest that Pistorius obtains no advantage over an 
able-bodied competitor.25 
In a 1987 study published in Archives of Physical 
Medical Rehabilitation, researchers evaluated the 
Flex-Foot, made by Ossur and similar to the 
Cheetah, against a human foot.  Landing on a 
human foot in a running stride gave a 241% spring 
efficiency, or energy return, because of the 
 
 20 Goldberg, supra note 3. 
 21 Hugh Herr is a professor of media, arts and sciences at Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT), and Director of the Institute’s Biomechatronics Group.  He is also a 
double amputee. His work on prosthetic limbs won Popular Mechanics magazine’s first 
annual Breakthrough Leadership Award in 2005. See Hugh Herr Wins Popular 
Mechanics’ Leadership Award, Oct. 5, 2005, http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2005/herr-
1005.html. 
 22 See Posting of Amber Smith to Health & Fitness Blog, 
http://blog.syracuse.com/healthfitness/2007/08/todays_athletic_prosthetics_ar.html (Aug. 
7, 2007, 0:03 EST) (posting an L.A. Times article by Jeannine Stein). 
 23 IAAF Competition Rule 144.2, supra note 3. 
 24 See Smith, supra note 22. 
 25 Ossur, the Icelandic manufacturer of the prosthetic limbs used by Pistorius, contends 
that Pistorius gets only between 60–70% of the return that a natural lower limb produces. 
See Pryor, supra note 1. 
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contraction of the calf muscles.  In comparison, the 
Flex-Foot had an 82% spring efficiency.26 
Robert Gailey, a professor at University of Miami Medical 
School, comments further: 
Are they looking at not having an unfair advantage?  
Or are they discriminating because of the purity of 
the Olympics, because they don’t want to see a 
disabled man line up against an able-bodied man for 
fear that if the person who doesn’t have the perfect 
body wins, what does that say about the image of 
man? . . . There is no science that he has an 
advantage, only that he is competing at a 
disadvantage.27 
It is clear, therefore, that, in terms of the crude spring qualities, 
this device certainly affords Pistorius a performance advantage 
over and above anything he could achieve without such limbs.  
Nonetheless, the crucial point here is that as regards the definition 
of the pertinent IAAF rule, this device does not give him an 
advantage “over another athlete not using such a device.”28  The 
question then arises as to how his eligibility should have been 
decided: should the performance advantage be measured against 
that which he would be able to achieve without his prosthetic limbs 
(ineligible) or should it be measured against the very athletes 
against whom he would be competing (eligible)?  These artificial 
limbs appear to enable Pistorius to compete, albeit still at a 
disadvantage, against able-bodied athletes.  It may therefore be 
suggested that it is perverse to deny him the right to compete and 
earn his living as a professional athlete on the able-bodied circuit if 
the basis of the decision is taken purely on the spring qualities of 
the devices. 
With the agreement of Pistorius, the IAAF conducted an 
investigation into the nature of his artificial limbs, with the aim of 
producing definitive guidelines concerning the use of such 
prosthetic limbs.  The President of IAAF, Lamine Diack, noted 
 
 26 Smith, supra note 22. 
 27 Longman, supra note 18. 
 28 IAAF Competition Rule 144.2, supra note 3. 
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that the study, which was conducted in October and November of 
2007, would ultimately decide whether Pistorius could use these 
particular prosthetic limbs.29  The argument, as explained by 
Diack, did not appear to be about the use of prosthetic limbs per 
se, but rather about the use of what he termed technical aids.  He 
commented: 
It is important to underline that the IAAF does not 
have, nor contemplate, a ban on prosthetic limbs, 
but rather technical aids.  The aim of the rule 
change is not an attempt to prevent disabled athletes 
from using any artificial limbs or competing against 
able-bodied athletes if they are good enough to do 
so.30 
Diack then went on to explain the rationale behind the IAAF 
investigation: 
I am a great admirer of the Paralympic movement, 
and I would like to take this opportunity to 
congratulate Oscar on all his achievements to date.  
Yet now that Oscar has improved his times to the 
extent that he is able to compete in open athletics 
competitions, the IAAF has a duty to make sure that 
his prosthetics are analysed carefully.  We cannot 
permit technical aids that give one athlete an unfair 
advantage over another.  Personally, I am very 
pleased that Oscar has agreed to do this research31 
with Professor Bruggemann,32 as the results will 
have very important implications for sports 
science.33 
 
 29 IAAF and Oscar Pistorius to Co-operate, International Sports Press Association, 
July 26, 2007, http://www.aipsmedia.com/index.php?page=news&cod=1349&tp=n 
[hereinafter Co-operate]. 
 30 Id. 
 31 In addition to examining the biomechanical properties of his prosthetic limbs, the 
tests (which were paid for by the IAAF at a cost of €30,000) also measured Pistorius 
against six other runners of similar quality and attempted to measure the entirety of his 
performance. See Pryor, supra note 1. 
 32 Bruggemann is one of the world’s leading independent experts in athletics 
biomechanics at Cologne University’s Institute of Biomechanics in Germany. 
 33 Co-operate, supra note 29. 
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While Diack’s rationale appears entirely reasonable, there must 
be some concern about the system of measurement utilized in the 
tests by the IAAF.  While the measurement of the crude mechanics 
of the limbs themselves should not have proved to be problematic, 
what may have been more difficult were the intangible advantages 
and disadvantages that Pistorius gains.  How, for example, may the 
fatiguing effect of lactic acid buildup in the calves of able-bodied 
athletes in the final stages of a 400 meters race be measured and 
the commensurate disadvantages suffered by them against 
Pistorius, who would suffer no such problems?34  Conversely is it 
possible to quantify the disadvantages that Pistorius has suffered 
throughout his life and continues to suffer as a direct result of his 
disability?  Just as Pistorius suffers no fatigue in his legs below his 
knees, similarly he is only able to produce propulsive effects via 
muscles above his knees.  The likely net effect of his particular 
personal circumstances must be extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, to accurately quantify.  However, it was crucial for 
Pistorius that the entire package of benefit and detriment was taken 
into consideration when assessing the impact of these artificial 
limbs, rather than the investigation looking solely at the limbs in 
isolation.  Even if it was proven that the limbs themselves 
produced a real and obvious advantage, might such an advantage 
merely be viewed as redressing the overall performance balance, 
and therefore may not be viewed as an advantage over other elite 
athletes at his level of performance?  By exploring the global 
performance of Pistorius rather than merely examining the effects 
of the prosthetic limbs on him in isolation, it is submitted that we 
retain objectivity in assessing not just the status of Pistorius, but 
also any athletes who may be in his position in the future.  To 
properly assess possible performance advantage, one should also 
examine the overall detriment that personal circumstances may 
cause a participant.  Equity demands that it is the net status of 
performance, rather than the isolated effects of the prosthetic 
limbs, that drives eligibility in the circumstances in which Pistorius 
found himself.  The IAAF appears to have attempted an equitable 
 
 34 The IAAF instigated the tests after they contested that they had evidence that he was 
the only 400 metres runner in history to run the second half of the race faster than the first 
half. See Pryor, supra note 1. 
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testing regime by measuring the performance of Pistorius against 
six other athletes of similar ability.  The BBC reported that: 
“Pistorius ran alongside six able-bodied athletes who have similar 
400 [meter] personal bests to him, in order to establish whether his 
blades counted as ‘technical aids,’ which are forbidden in 
competition.”35 
In their attempts to ensure that the testing procedure was fair, 
the IAAF may have unwittingly put in place a testing regime that 
was flawed and potentially biased against Pistorius.  Quite clearly, 
by measuring him against six other athletes capable of achieving 
similar times, the IAAF attempted to compare like with like.  
However, the position of Oscar Pistorius is unlike any other 
athlete. While he may currently be running times around 46 
seconds, he has only been running seriously for just over three 
years.36  It may well be the case that a more accurate measure 
would be to assess him against athletes who have run considerably 
faster, rather than against those who are close to their peak at the 
times Pistorius is currently capable of running.  Pistorius’ potential 
may be far greater than those against whom he is being measured.  
The physiology of the performance of an elite athlete at the very 
peak of their performance may be significantly different to the 
physiology of a good athlete (those against whom Pistorius is 
currently being measured) at the peak of their particular 
performance. The question must be asked: into which category 
should Pistorius fall?  The IAAF has clearly placed him in the 
latter category, when it may have been more appropriate to 
measure him against the very elite, against whom he aspires to 
race.  The IAAF appeared to conclude following the tests that 
Pistorius’ performance was quantitatively different to those 
currently running his times.  Therefore, it would seem that they 
concluded that his prosthetics gave him an unfair advantage, which 
left them no choice but to ban him from competing.  It is at least 
 
 35 Sam Lyon, Pistorius Waits on IAAF All-Clear, BBC SPORT, Nov. 16, 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/athletics/6917645.stm. 
 36 He took up running seriously following an injury received playing rugby. Track 
work formed part of his rehabilitation program. Phil Stewart, “Fastest Man on No Legs” 
Put to Rome Test, REUTERS, July 12, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/reutersEdge/ 
idUSL1282940920070712. 
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debatable that this is a flawed approach and that the true test of his 
abilities should be measured against elite athletes, rather than 
merely good ones. 
Immediately prior to the release of the ruling denying Pistorius 
the right to compete in the Olympics, news unfortunately leaked 
out making it clear that the IAAF would deny him entry into the 
Games.  Writing in The UK Times, Pryor cited a conversation 
between Professor Brugemann37 and Die Welt:38 
He [Pistorius] has a considerable advantage 
compared with athletes without prosthetic limbs 
who have undergone the same tests. . . . The 
difference is several percentage points and I did not 
think the findings would be so clear. . . . [H]is 
aerobic performance was worse, his anaerobic 
performance was the same.  He could be in better 
shape.  The fact that he still runs the same times as 
the other runners is due to his prosthetics.  The 
prosthetics return 90 per cent [sic] of the impact 
energy, compared to the 60 per cent [sic] of the 
human foot.39 
While it is regrettable that this news appeared to have leaked 
out in this manner, it is clear that the apparent data attained on the 
prosthetic limbs is broadly consistent with data cited earlier.40  
However, the data gleaned concerning the biomechanical 
properties of the human foot appears to differ widely from that 
cited earlier.41  The differentiation is so great that concern must be 
raised as to how accurate it can ever be to assess performance 
benefit and detriment in this manner. 
 
 37 Brugemann is the scientist leading the team responsible for testing Pistorius. Id. 
 38 A German daily newspaper established in 1946. See Die Welt, Britannica Online 
Encyclopedia, http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9076527/Die-Welt (last visited Feb. 
11, 2008). 
 39 Pryor, supra note 1. 
 40 See, Longman, supra note 18 (noting that a prosthetic similar to that used by 
Pistorius had an 80% efficiency rating, compared to the 90% reported here). 
 41 Compare this figure of 80% to the study reported supra note 18 where the human 
foot was reported to be capable of generating its own energy return to the tune of 241% 
of that put in. See id. 
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Pistorius’ feats in attaining this level of performance may be a 
precursor of things to come for the IAAF and other sports 
governing bodies.  Goldberg has noted the impact of the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq on the number of young Americans returning 
from these conflicts with disabling injuries.  They comment: 
And while Pistorius could become the first amputee 
to qualify for an Olympic track event, he probably 
won’t be the last to give it a try.  With more and 
more soldiers returning from Afghanistan and Iraq 
with disabling injuries and high-tech fixes, the 
population of disabled American athletes is growing 
at a faster rate than anytime since the Vietnam 
war.42 
It therefore seems certain that there are likely to be further 
challenges to the sporting establishment from disabled athletes 
wishing to compete against able-bodied participants; we also may 
see legal challenges to the decisions of sports governing bodies.  
With the tests conducted on Pistorius costing in the range of 
€30,000, such challenges may place a high financial burden on 
sports governing bodies.  Conversely, if it is left to the individual 
athlete to fund such tests, the high costs involved may prove to be 
prohibitively expensive, meaning few, if any, challenges will get 
off the ground.  In the leading American case on the rights of 
disabled sports participants,43 the subject of cost and resources was 
an issue raised as being significant by the dissenting opinion,44 
examined below. 
RELEVANT CASE LAW 
Disabled American professional golfer Casey Martin fought all 
the way to the Supreme Court for the right to use a golf cart when 
competing on the United States professional tour.  Martin suffers 
from a degenerative circulatory disorder, Klippel-Trenaunay-
Weber Syndrome, a progressive disease that obstructs the flow of 
 
 42 Goldberg, supra note 3. 
 43 See generally PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin (Martin III), 532 U.S. 661 (2001). 
 44 Id. at 696–98 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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blood from his right leg to his heart.45  The consequence of this is 
severe pain, anxiety and an inability to walk 18 holes.46  The 
Supreme Court was first required to answer whether the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) applied to entry to professional golf 
tournaments by a qualified disabled individual.  In answering 
affirmatively, the Court ruled that under Title III of the ADA the 
Professional Golfers’ Association (“PGA”) Tour was prohibited 
from denying Martin equal access to its tour.47  Title III of the 
ADA states: “[N]o individual shall be discriminated against on the 
basis of a disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, 
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of 
any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, 
leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public 
accommodation.”48 
Once the first question was answered positively, the Court then 
focused on three questions pertaining to the request modification: 
(1) whether the requested modification was a reasonable one, (2) 
whether it was necessary to help the disabled individual, and (3) 
whether it would fundamentally alter the nature of the 
competition.49  In describing the Ninth Circuit’s finding that 
Martin affirmatively answered the first two questions, the Court 
stated that “permitting Martin to use a golf cart was both a 
‘reasonable and a necessary solution to the problem of providing 
him access to the tournaments.’”50 
Without the provision of a cart, Martin would be denied equal 
access to the PGA tour.  The provision of a cart, as the Supreme 
Court acknowledged,51 was not something that would merely make 
Martin’s experience more comfortable.  It was of fundamental 
 
 45 Id. at 668. 
 46 Id. A professional golf tournament comprises four eighteen-hole rounds, played over 
four days. Typically courses are 6500–7500 yards in length and the average professional 
will walk an estimate of at least 4 miles each round. See PGA Tour 
Schedule,PGATour.com, http://www.pgatour.com/r/schedule (last visited Feb. 12, 2008). 
 47 Martin III, 532 U.S. at 677. 
 48 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2008). 
 49 Martin III, 532 U.S. at 682–83. 
 50 Id. at 673 (quoting Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc. (Martin II), 204 F.3d 994, 1001 (9th 
Cir. 2000)). 
 51 Id. at 682. 
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importance, as without it he simply could not fulfill the 
requirement of walking the golf course.  It was therefore both a 
reasonable and a necessary provision.52 
The key issue that the Court therefore needed to address was 
whether allowing Martin to use a cart would “fundamentally alter” 
the nature of the event.53 Investigating this question, the Court 
found that there were actually three different sets of rules 
governing the playing of golf in the United States.54  The pertinent 
rule was covered in the “Conditions of Competition and Local 
Rules,” sometimes referred to as the “hard card.”55  The Court 
stated that the “hard card” required professional golfers “to walk 
the golf course during tournaments, but not during open qualifying 
rounds.”56  Martin had been permitted to use a cart while attending 
Stanford University and in the PGA Tour’s Qualifying school.57  
However, at the third stage, the PGA Tour enforced a strict 
interpretation of the “hard card” rules and refused to allow Martin 
to use a cart.58  The PGA Tour further refused to review medical 
records submitted by Martin in support of his application,59 
therefore arguably failing to take Martin’s individual 
circumstances into account, as required by the ADA.60  In 
assessing the nature of golf, the PGA Tour “asserted that the 
condition of walking is a substantive rule of competition, and that 
waiving it as to any individual for any reason would fundamentally 
alter the nature of the competition.”61 
Expert testimony provided by individuals, such as Jack 
Nicklaus, Arnold Palmer, and Ken Venturi, explained the 
importance of the nature of the fatigue in golf engendered in part 
by walking the course, and further that such fatigue was 
particularly important on the last day of a tournament when 
 
 52 See id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. at 666. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. at 667 (citation omitted). 
 57 Id. n.4. 
 58 Id. at 669. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. at 668. 
 61 Id. at 670. 
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physical and psychological pressure was at its height.62 However, 
while suggesting that the use of a cart may give an individual an 
advantage over other participants, the expert testimony gave no 
opinion on any potential advantage that Martin specifically may or 
may not gain from such use.63  In finding for Martin, the Court 
assessed the nature of any advantage gained by him in comparison 
to other competitors, rather than simply assessing the performance 
benefit accruing from the use of the cart in absolute terms.  In fact, 
the district court judge found that: 
[P]laintiff is in significant pain when he walks, and 
even when he is getting in and out of the cart.  With 
each step, he is at risk of fracturing his tibia and 
hemorrhaging.  The other golfers have to endure the 
psychological stress of competition as part of their 
fatigue; Martin has the same stress plus the added 
stress of pain and risk of serious injury. . . . To 
perceive that the cart puts him—with his 
condition—at a competitive advantage is a gross 
distortion of reality.64 
It was acknowledged that his use of a cart was a modification 
of the nature of the event.  However, the Supreme Court held that 
such a modification would not “fundamentally alter” the nature of 
the event and that it was reasonable and necessary modification.65  
Therefore, the Court held that the use of a cart was justified under 
the three ADA requirements.66 
Casey Martin is not the only golfer in the United States in 
recent years to resort to the courts in an attempt to be granted 
permission to use a golf cart in a PGA event.67 Although not 
suffering from the same disorder as Martin,68 Ford Olinger’s 
disability caused similar problems and his case, like Martin’s, 
 
 62 Id. at 671. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. at 670 (citing Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc. (Martin I), 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1251 (D. 
Or. 1998)). 
 65 Id. at 690. 
 66 Id. 
 67 See generally Olinger v. U.S. Golf Ass’n (Olinger I), 205 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 68 Olinger suffers from bilateral avascular necrosis, a degenerative condition that 
significantly impairs his ability to walk. Id. at 1001. 
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hinged on his request to use a golf cart in the U.S. Open Golf 
Championship.  However, in finding against Olinger,69 the Court 
held that to allow him to use the cart would “fundamentally alter 
the nature of the competition.”70  Essentially, the Court opined that 
there were two distinct reasons to deny Olinger use of a cart.  The 
first was an argument that had been dismissed in Martin:71  that the 
fatigue engendered by walking was a critical part of golf and the 
use of a cart would impact upon this, thus fundamentally altering 
the nature of the challenge faced by Olinger.72  Partially quoting 
the district court, the Seventh Circuit held: 
The point of an athletic competition . . . is to decide 
who, under conditions that are about the same for 
everyone, can perform an assigned set of tasks 
better than (not as well as) any other competitor.  
The set of tasks assigned to the competitor in the 
U.S. Open includes not merely striking a golf ball 
with precision, but doing so under greater than 
usual mental and physical stress.  The 
accommodation Mr. Olinger seeks, while 
reasonable in a general sense, would alter the 
fundamental nature of that competition. . . . physical 
endurance and stamina and uniform rules are 
critical factors in determining the winner of a 
championship-level golf competition.  Dr. Theodore 
Holland also testified that physical endurance and 
stamina are important criteria in determining the 
national golf champion.  As he put it, “[t]here is a 
lot more to getting . . . around those 72 holes than 
just hitting the shots.”73 
While acknowledging the importance of fatigue under some 
circumstances, the suspicion remains that the court took no account 
 
 69 Petition for a writ of certiorari was granted and the case was remanded to the Seventh 
Circuit for further review in light of the Martin decision. See Olinger v. U.S. Golf Ass’n 
(Olinger II), 532 U.S. 1064, 1064 (2001). 
 70 Olinger I, 205 F.3d at 1006. 
 71 Martin III, 532 U.S. at 667–78. 
 72 Olinger I, 205 F.3d at 1006–07. 
 73 Id. at 1006 (citation omitted). 
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of the additional strains faced by Olinger due to his disability and 
merely measured the benefit accrued from cart usage against an 
able-bodied competitor, rather than measuring the advantage 
Olinger may obtain relative to the position he held due to his 
disability.  This is an issue of fundamental importance when 
assessing whether or not an athlete may gain an advantage through 
the use of an artificial aid.  The performance advantage obtained 
from the aid in isolation should not be the criterion upon which 
eligibility is measured.  Arguably, the only appropriate approach is 
to weigh the individual circumstances in every situation.  While 
such individual inquiry may prove a difficult standard for a 
governing body to meet and certainly may have resource 
implications, perhaps encouraging further litigation,74 it is 
submitted that it is the most appropriate approach.  Indeed, when 
considering the position of Casey Martin, it was specifically noted 
that the United States Golf Association (“USGA”) paid no heed to 
his individual circumstances.  The Court stressed that such refusal 
was specifically against the purpose of the ADA: 
Refusal of non-profit professional golf association 
to consider disabled golfer’s personal circumstances 
in deciding whether to accommodate his disability 
ran counter to the clear language and purpose of the 
ADA, despite the association’s claim that all the 
substantive rules for its “highest-level” 
competitions were sacrosanct and could not be 
modified under any circumstances.75 
Under the text of the ADA, there exists an obligation, as 
acknowledged in Martin III,76 to take into account the individual 
circumstances of the claimant golfer in assessing the provision of a 
 
 74 42 U.S.C. § 101(10) (1990) specifically addresses undue hardship, which may be 
forced upon an organization in complying with the act, citing such issues as expense and 
resource implications for an organization in seeking to accommodate a disabled 
individual.  It was noted earlier, for example, that the tests undertaken by Oscar Pistorius 
cost about €30,000. Martin III, 532 U.S. at 683 (Scalia J., dissenting).  This raised 
concerns about the likelihood of encouraging further litigation if Martin was allowed to 
use a cart. 
 75 Martin III, 532 U.S. at 689. 
 76 Id. at 690. 
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cart.77  This principle quite clearly goes hand-in-hand with the 
notion of a reasonable accommodation from the perspective of the 
competitor.  In looking at what may amount to a reasonable 
accommodation, the nature of such inquiry is compelled to be an 
individual one.  Only by investigating the nature of the individual’s 
disability and the nature of the accommodation needed for them to 
be granted equal access to their chosen activity can the 
reasonableness of that proposed accommodation be assessed. The 
act rightly focuses on the individual’s dealing with discrimination 
and barriers to equality.78  Such an inquiry will have important 
implications for any individual attempting to rely on such a 
provision and will also have far-reaching resource implications for 
any governing body. 
The second reason offered for refusing Olinger’s request to use 
a cart was that the modification, the permission to use a cart, was 
not a reasonable one.79  The issue was whether the USGA would 
have to undergo undue hardship in granting the use of a cart.80  In 
assessing undue hardship, the ADA states: 
The term “undue hardship” means an action 
requiring significant difficulty or expense, when 
considered in light of the factors set forth in [this 
chapter]. . . . In determining whether an 
accommodation would impose an undue hardship 
on a covered entity, factors to be considered include 
the nature and cost of the accommodation needed 
under this chapter; the overall financial resources of 
the facility or facilities involved in the provision of 
the reasonable accommodation; the number of 
persons employed at such facility; the effect on 
expenses and resources, or the impact otherwise of 
such accommodation upon the operation of the 
facility; the overall financial resources of the 
covered entity; the overall size of the business of a 
covered entity with respect to the number of its 
 
 77 Id. 
 78 42 U.S.C. § 12101. 
 79 Olinger v. U.S. Golf Ass’n (Olinger I), 205 F.3d 1001, 1005 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 80 42 U.S.C. § 102(b)(5)(A). 
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employees; the number, type, and location of its 
facilities.81 
In assessing the position of the USGA in relation to the ADA, 
the court, again citing agreement with the district court, noting: 
the administrative burdens of evaluating requests to 
waive the walking rule and permit the use of a golf 
cart.  As the [district] court explained, the USGA 
“would need to develop a system and a fund of 
expertise82 to determine whether a given applicant 
truly needs, or merely wants, or could use but does 
not need, to ride a cart to compete.”  The district 
court thought that this should be unnecessary.  We 
agree.83 
This seems a remarkable reason to cite given the vast wealth of 
the USGA and the likely infrequency of requests to use a cart.  
Indeed the Seventh Circuit stated that the USGA had received only 
a dozen requests from eleven different people to use a cart in 
fourteen years.84 
The relevant legislation in England and Wales is similar in 
many ways to the provisions in existence in the United States.  
Under the Disability Discrimination Act 1995,85 just as in the 
United States under the ADA 1990,86 a duty exists to make 
reasonable adjustments in order to accommodate the disabled 
individual to whom the relevant act may apply.  While there have 
been no cases involving professional sports participants attempting 
to gain access to facilities or employment opportunities, the lead 
case in England and Wales87 appears to suggest that the duty to 
make reasonable accommodation may actually extend to positive 
 
 81 Id. § 101(10)(A)–(B). 
 82 Pryor, supra note 1.  The tests undertaken by Oscar Pistorius have cost around 
€30,000. As technology advances it is not difficult to imagine such tests increasing in 
complexity and therefore cost.  Similarly if Pistorius is successful in his quest, then others 
are likely to follow.  This will push the boundaries further and add to the financial and 
administrative burden that international sports governing bodies will face. 
 83 Olinger I, 205 F.3d at 1007. 
 84 Id. at 1003. 
 85 Disability Discrimination Act, 1995, c. 6. (Eng.). 
 86 42 U.S.C § 12182 (1990). 
 87 See generally Archibald v. Fife Council [2004] UKHL 32 (U.K.). 
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discrimination discriminating in favor of the disabled person to 
effectively “level the playing field.”88 
Mrs. Archibald was employed as a road-sweeper.  Following 
minor surgery she was unable to carry out her normal duties.  Her 
employers, the Fife Council in Scotland, subsequently made 
commendable efforts to find her alternative work, including 
retraining,89 and wherever possible, short-listing her as a matter of 
course for jobs that she was qualified to perform.  In the next few 
months, Mrs. Archibald applied unsuccessfully for over 100 jobs 
with the council.90  She was eventually dismissed on the grounds 
of incapacity almost two years after her original surgery.  In 
hearing her appeal, the court held that reasonable accommodations 
may extend to offering the opportunity for a disabled worker to be 
re-employed at a higher grade without having to go through a 
competitive interview, despite the Fife Council’s policy that 
anyone being re-employed at a higher grade had to go through a 
competitive interview process.91  Effectively, the House of Lords 
held that such positive discrimination might be necessary to 
eliminate the disadvantage that may be suffered as a result of the 
disability.92 
The possibility of discriminating positively in favor of the 
disabled person would have important consequences for Oscar 
Pistorius.  If the tests carried out on Pistorius are conclusive that 
the prosthetic limbs do indeed go further than merely redressing 
the balance of performance, then Archibald93 and Meikle94 would 
appear to suggest that under disability discrimination law this 
alone should not prove fatal to Pistorius’ chances of competing in 
the Olympics. 
 
 88 Id. at ¶ 57. 
 89 Id. at ¶ 53. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. at ¶ 54. 
 92 The Court of Appeal in Nottinghamshire County Council v. Meikle extended the 
notion of reasonable accommodation to the provision of sick pay. 2004 WL 1372520, at ¶ 
57 (U.K.). The Court held that a reasonable accommodation might involve treating the 
disabled employee more favorably than an able-bodied employee in assessing eligibility 
for contractual sick pay. Id. at ¶ 54. 
 93 See generally Archibald, [2004] UKHL 32. 
 94 See generally Meikle, 2004 WL 1372520. 
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Ultimately however, the key issue for Pistorius would appear to 
be one based on pure scientific analysis—do his “blades” give him 
an advantage over and above other comparable competitors.  The 
IAAF ruled that they did and thus prevented him from running in 
the Olympic Games.  However, it may be suggested that science is 
not the most not the most important consideration; it is to these 
other issues that this article now turns. 
ANALYSIS 
In order to unpack some of the conceptual and jurisprudential 
questions generated by Pistorius’ situation, we should return to the 
US Supreme Court’s discussion of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act in Martin.95  The three questions the Court faced with respect 
to Title III of the Act—whether a modification is reasonable, 
necessary, and such that it would alter the nature of a 
competition—merit further consideration.  However, a 
terminological divergence from the Supreme Court’s approach is 
necessary.  The questions can be productively translated into 
alternative analytical categories: commensurability, classification, 
and sporting ideals.  The first, commensurability, refers to whether 
we are justified in making a comparison between different 
competitors facing different challenges.  The second, classification, 
refers to how we classify competitors on the basis of those 
different challenges.  The third, sporting ideals, refers to the 
fundamental assumptions underpinning both comparison and 
classification in the context of sports. 
A. Commensurability 
Commensurability concerns what can and cannot be compared.  
If, and only if, two things are capable of being compared, 
commensurable, can a comparison be legitimate.96  The foregoing 
legal debate concerning Pistorius generated at least two axes of 
comparison: The physical and psychological challenges faced by 
 
 95 See supra note 43–66 and accompanying text. 
 96 This simple, but crucial point by Aristotle underpins the notion of equity and 
equality. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, V.3. § 1131a10-b15 (Roger Crisp trans. 
2000). 
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competitors.  Our first question is: Are these commensurable 
challenges in themselves?  And, secondly, are the challenges faced 
by one competitor commensurable with the challenges faced by 
another?  In response to the first question: The physical and the 
psychological are very different challenges and should not be 
compared directly.  Although all sporting competitors face both 
mental and physical challenges, these are of a very different order 
to one another.  While the physical challenges faced by Pistorius 
are very much of the essence here, he, undoubtedly, like any 
competitor, faces psychological challenges in the form of focus, 
preparedness, and the psychological “challenge” generated by the 
presence and competitive spirit of his competitors.  And further, 
Pistorius’ psychological challenges are commensurable to those of 
his competitors: He may face additional psychological challenges 
grounded in his physical attributes, but those challenges may well 
be mirrored in psychological challenges faced by his competitors.97  
But one should note that these are challenges of an entirely 
different order to physical challenges.  Thus, because they are 
therefore incommensurable, the mental and physical cannot 
compensate for one another.  When we come to classify the fitness, 
readiness, skill, or strength of sportspersons we do not allow the 
physical injury of one to be compensated by the mental make-up or 
psychological challenges of another.  If we were to attempt to 
compensate for differing levels of psychological preparedness we 
would begin to undermine fundamental principles, including 
performance, at work in any sport. 
The question of physical fatigue is clearly more complex.  
While his competitors share similar forms of physiological fatigue, 
“similarity” being assumed on the basis of their all being elite 
athletes trained in the same event, Pistorius’ physiological fatigue 
is different.  His fatigue is different but is it nonetheless 
commensurable?  For his fatigue to be incommensurable it would 
demand not a quantitatively different but a qualitatively different 
degree of fatigue in comparison to his competitors.  An example 
would be if the fatigue was so negligible, manageable, or 
 
 97 Cf. Lise Gauvin & John C. Spence, Psychological Research on Exercise and Fitness: 
Current Research Trends and Future Challenges, in THE SPORT PSYCHOLOGIST 9, 434–48 
(1995) (discussing the meta-research undertaken). 
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surmountable as to fail to count as fatigue at all.  One should note 
that this is a descriptive question: Would we describe two different 
kinds of pain in two different people as sufficiently similar?  Given 
the unique nature of pain, this is a difficult question to answer.  If 
we describe pain behaviors, then it is simpler to ask: Does 
Pistorius displays the outward signs of fatigue?  Again, this is a 
descriptive, empirical question.  In the absence of scientific advice 
to the contrary98 we should assume that it is not qualitatively 
different fatigue; thus, it should not be commensurable.  A 
definitive scientific finding that Pistorius experienced no fatigue at 
all in any meaningful sense would demand a particular 
classification of Pistorius as a competitor: A competitor who 
should not be compared to those who do experience fatigue.  If on 
the other hand it remains clear in scientific terms that Pistorius 
does experience fatigue in some way then we are not permitted to 
dismiss Pistorius’ claim a priori. 
B. Classification 
If Oscar Pistorius and his physiological make-up are, at the 
very least, commensurable with those of other competitors who 
similarly experience fatigue, then we have to ask further questions 
of how we should classify him.99  The first question of 
classification is: What kind of competitor is he?  He is, by 
definition, a sportsman, but should he be classed as an elite 
sportsman?  Secondly, there is the question of classification in 
terms of disability, a social designation or status, versus handicap, 
a competitive designation or status.  These particular 
classifications—and the gradations within them—are central not 
only to sound moral and legal decision-making, but are also at the 
center of discussion of sport.  In fact, the questions of sporting-
classification and disability-classification overlap.  Both are 
essential for fair competition, because the classifications determine 
what ability can be realized by individuals and further determines 
 
 98 Even leaked information on scientific study of Pistorius’ performance concedes he 
experiences some comparable challenges. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 99 For a key discussion of the relevance of this, see Leslie Pickering Francis, 
Competitive Sports, Disability, and Problems of Justice in Sports, in JOURNAL OF THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF SPORTS 127–32 (2005). 
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who is compared to whom.  Thus, classifications draw the 
boundaries between achievement and non-achievement.100 
Classifying an athlete as “disabled” generates significant 
problems, but these problems are germane.  In short, being 
classified as disabled, like any other classification, involves 
internal and external comparison.  Internal classification is within 
existing, established boundaries, such as the conventions and 
standards of a group, sport, or movement.  In this sense, although 
Pistorius may be perceived as disabled, the very fact that he runs 
means that the designation disabled is problematic.  External 
classification allows classification on bases external to those 
established boundaries.  One such example is whether we should 
gauge his situation not in terms of social disability but rather in 
terms of relative handicaps within certain activities?101  In this 
sense, the “handicap” potentially lies with the other competitors 
and not with Pistorius.  This division of external and internal 
classifications is easiest to discern if we consider whether Pistorius 
is a “disabled runner.” The question of whether Pistorius should be 
classified as “a disabled runner” is a classification that can be 
made on two grounds, depending upon whether we take the 
“disabled” component or the “runner component” as primary.  If 
disabled is the primary component, then an internal classification 
is based on whatever is stipulated as “the set of all disabled 
people.”  On the other hand, the external classification would be all 
of the standards external to that set, including the question of 
whether “disabled” is meaningful at all or whether it presumes a 
standard of ability so inhumanly broad as to be meaningless.  If 
runner is the primary component, then classification is determined 
by whatever professional standards runners adhere to; in effect 
deferring questions of classification to professional sporting 
bodies.  This becomes less a question of Pistorius-as-disabled and 
more a question of whether there is a handicap in place.  External 
to that are any other possible comparisons, including whether it is 
possible to define “runner” at all, given that any definition 
 
 100 See generally Gudrun Doll-Tepper, Disability Sport, in THE INTERNATIONAL 
POLITICS OF SPORT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (Jim Riordan & Arnd Kruger eds., 
London 1999). 
 101 See Francis, supra note 99, at 130. 
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stipulated by a professional body is likely to arbitrarily exclude 
otherwise legitimate forms of running, such as someone running 
for a bus.  In sum, even if classification is possible within a 
recognized standard, it is always possible to make comparisons 
outside the set of standards deployed by that body.  Consequently, 
the question of what is ‘necessary,’ in the idiom of the Supreme 
Court, to include or exclude from a classification is always—to a 
greater or lesser extent—a partly arbitrary classification.  This is 
because there is also something external to that classification that 
can be appealed to in order to challenge the classification.  
Classification is, therefore, something determined in many 
contexts by “insiders” who, with experience in the field or activity, 
are able to perceive classification boundaries purely on the basis of 
their insider experience.  Those classifications are not purely 
arbitrary, however: They will include, in the context of sporting 
endeavour, the input of crucial sporting ideals. 
C. Sporting Ideals 
Three dimensions of sporting ideals are important: 
achievement, fair play, and excellence.  We will consider these 
consecutively.  First, achievement should be distinguished from 
excellence.  Achievement is relative to any chosen standard; 
excellence, on the other hand, appeals to an objective standard of 
human excellence.  Achievement is linked to performance, albeit 
performance in a double sense.  On the one hand, the 
“maximization of one’s performance” is a dimension of 
achievement (though not its sufficient condition).  However, 
achievement can be relative to others, to oneself, or to any other 
gauge.  “Performance” also connotes that sport is performed in 
front of spectators.  Certainly no one could dispute Pistorius’ 
achievement in terms of pure performance, in terms of both 
maximizing an impressive performance of speed and thereby 
providing a “performance” for spectators that is incomparable.  
Moreover, his achievement in the wider possible sense is 
impressive by any standard: in relation to his own background, to 
others born with his condition, to other runners who are non-
professional runners, and to other runners who are professional 
runners.  In terms of achievement alone, Pistorius’ running is 
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completely comparable to that of any other sportsperson, albeit on 
the basis that we are free to define achievement however we wish. 
“Fair play” is more problematic insofar as it begs fundamental 
questions about nuanced, often implicit, expectations and 
standards.102  In other words, not only is fair play a negative 
injunction to adhere to the letter and spirit of the rules and avoid 
deceptive or perfidious means of achieving advantage, but also, 
positively, a question of infusing one’s whole approach with high 
standards of equity and fairness centered not only on achievement 
but acknowledging the talents and achievement of others.103  In 
this sense there is no unequivocal response to Pistorius’ wish to 
run, not in terms of his own sporting ethos (which is presumably 
impeccable), but in terms of the perceptions of fellow competitors 
and indeed of spectators.  Would they see Pistorius’ presence as a 
reflection of fair play?  The answer must be both yes and no.  In 
terms of raw perception, his presence, despite any classificatory or 
comparative justification, may simply look like an affront to the 
principles by which sports undertaken.  It simply cannot be said 
that his whole approach is infused with equity and fairness because 
he appears to have an advantage.  We cannot ignore this extrinsic 
dimension of the experience of sport; the idea that the perceptions 
of spectators viewing a performance play an important role in 
conceptualizing both sport as a whole and fair play more 
specifically.  At the same time, sport and fair play are not reducible 
to the perception of spectators: Fair play in the first instance is 
something determined by experienced insiders who know and 
ultimately dictate the legitimate boundaries of a sport.  To make 
the same point in abstract terms, all boundaries are porous 
boundaries.  The “inside” and “outside” of sport are not 
impermeable; the standards of fair play go beyond sport in the 
same way that law and ethics generally have to inform sport.  In 
sum, fair play is not something that can be definitely stated and 
monopolized by sport or sports, rather it evolves as all mores 
 
 102 For a critical discussion of the “bag-of-virtues” account of fair play, see Robert 
Butcher & Angela Schneider, Fair Play as Respect for the Game, 25 J. OF THE PHIL. OF 
SPORT 1–22 (1998). 
 103 See Sigmund Loland & Mike McNamee, Fair Play and the Ethos of Sports: An 
Eclectic Philosophical Framework, 27 J. OF THE PHIL. OF SPORT 63–80 (2000). 
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evolve.  Consequently, whether or not we (and sport spectators) 
perceive Pistorius’ presence as manifesting or lacking “fair play” is 
something that cannot be definitively stated.  Rather, it can and 
will change. 
As a final point on fundamental sporting principles, compare 
the foregoing discussion of fundamental sporting principles with 
the terms within which Pistorius’ position has been conceptualised: 
purity.  The “purity” of a sport looks like a prima facie intelligible 
claim concerning preservation of certain sporting standards that 
allow that particular sport to be undertaken in an equitable, and 
indeed, satisfying way.  In fact the notion of purity seems to add 
little to the principles of fair play and achievement, but has the 
rather more unpalatable connotation of maintaining a certain class 
of people (“able-bodied” people) as carrying the “essence” of the 
sport while others (“non-able bodied” people) can only undertake a 
variation on the “real” form of the sport.  This is not to say that 
sporting bodies should not apply standards or, absurdly, that they 
should avoid discrimination on all grounds including sporting 
ability.  Rather, purity is far less meaningful than sports’ 
relationship with excellence.  Translated into more robust terms, 
sport, particularly elite sport, aims to foster and manifest 
excellence, by manifesting a standard that “cannot be humanly 
surpassed.”  This is not without substantial problems in itself.  
Being “humanly” is a reification, a treating as real and concrete 
something that is only abstract.  There is no unchanging standard 
of “human” or “humanly” other than what we abstract from human 
activity in the past, present, or future.  Sporting excellence is 
similarly a way of stating in abstract terms that the highest 
standards within a particular form of activity has and will change 
over time.  To parallel, in standard philosophical discussions of 
“human excellence” (stemming, like discussion of equality, 
principally from Aristotle104), this “excellence” is actually a quite 
modest set of virtues whereby humans should strive to be the best 
they can be given the inheritance they receive from life and 
nature.105  Is there a better description of Pistorius’ bid for 
Olympic glory?  A manifestation of striving to draw the best he 
 
 104 ARISTOTLE, supra note 96, at VII, 1. 
 105 Id. at II, 6. 
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can from his natural inheritance, an inheritance that other, less-able 
individuals would not have been able to profit from.  
Consequently, if we rely in the final analysis on fundamental 
sporting principles, and if sporting excellence is to mean anything, 
Pistorius is an exemplar of excellence.  The classificatory question 
of whether he should be striving for excellence within this class of 
elite competitors is a question that simply cannot—legally, 
morally, or indeed logically—be satisfactorily resolved.  We 
should attend, rather, to his clear, and all-too-human, manifestation 
of excellence.  And although it can be overstated, this, in turn, may 
well contribute to wider ethical discourse and ethical evolution 
within and without sport.  This point is made forcefully by Loland 
and McManee: “If practiced according to our norm of fair play, we 
believe that sporting games can stand out as a paradigmatic 
practice of the possibility of moral dialogue that is so important in 
our modern, pluralistic societies.”106 
In other words, all of the principles enunciated by the Supreme 
Court—reasonable, necessary, and in keeping with sporting 
ideals—are principles which will evolve.  There is potential for 
them to evolve in a positive way that begins to erode the division 
between ability and disability.  Ultimately, this erosion of division 
is not simply gesture politics but “a paradigmatic practice of the 
possibility of moral dialogue” potentially conducted in the most 
public of arenas, the Olympic Games. 
CONCLUSION: PURITY VERSUS EXCELLENCE 
This Article has sought to demonstrate that Oscar Pistorius’ 
participation in the Olympic Games is consistent with the 
jurisprudence of both the United States Supreme Court and case 
law from England and Wales.  That jurisprudence may be 
inconsistent, but it offers sufficient grounds for opposing a 
superficial exclusion of Pistorius.  Exclusions are never more 
superficial then when they invoke the “purity” of a sporting 
endeavour.  This claim merely serves to obscure clearer debates 
concerning equity, comparability, and sporting ideals.  Those 
 
 106 See Loland & McNamee, supra note 103, at 76. 
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debates suggest that Pistorius’ participation is both consistent with 
basic principles at work in sporting justice but also that Pistorius’ 
participation serves an important symbolic function in its 
demonstration of the importance of excellence. 
Pistorius’ running is surely symbolic.  It is symbolic of the 
increasing importance of the cybernetic integration of humans and 
technology; it is also symbolic of the triumph of human 
determination and spirit.  The participation of Pistorius at the 
Olympic Games would be of crucial symbolic importance given 
the Olympic ideal: 
The goal of the Olympic Movement is to contribute 
to building a peaceful and better world by educating 
youth through sport practised without 
discrimination of any kind.  Discrimination, 
therefore, [is] not acceptable in either spirit or in 
practice on the basis of disability.  Discrimination 
on the basis of disability [is] no different and [is] as 
objectionable as discrimination on the basis of race, 
colour, sex, religion or politics.107 
However, the question of whether Pistorius’ participation at the 
Games would be anything more than symbolic, whether he has a 
right to participate, is the crux of the matter.  That right is 
conferred on those who are classified as facing commensurable 
challenges in pursuing human excellence, and who excel in 
challenging circumstances.  Any elite sporting activity is a meeting 
of equals to identify the first and best amongst those equals.  
Accordingly, Pistorius’ participation in a shared pursuit of 
excellence is absolutely in keeping with the ethos of elite sport.  It 
appears to have been determined that Pistorius’ prostheses offer 
him an advantage that is qualitatively different from those 
advantages that can be gained by other competitors.  However, this 
in itself may be highly questionable.  It may be decided by 
Pistorius himself—as an elite athlete committed to sporting 
ethics—cannot participate in sport.  However, until that point, the 
inclusion of Pistorius would have served to maintain both an ideal 
of excellence and a distinctive contribution to Olympic ideals.  
 
 107 Doll-Tepper, supra note 100, at 182 (quoting Dr. Robert Steadward). 
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Pistorius should run for both of these reasons, and, most 
importantly, because he has every right to run. 
